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FASHIONING A TEST FOR GERRYMANDERING
Stephen E. Gottlieb*

In Davis v. Bandemer,l the Supreme Court held that the shaping of electoral
districts to the advantage of one political party presents a justiciable issue. The
Court, however, had great difficulty identifying what constitutes gerrymandering.
The Davis case arose in Indiana after the Republican controlled legislature
developed a gerrymandering plan and passed it without the input or opportunity
for input by Democratic members. The oddly shaped districts showed little
correspondence with the lines of political subdivisions of the state and produced
a Republican majority in one house of the state legislature in the face of a
statewide Democratic victory at the polls. 2 Despite this result, the Court found
no right to relief in that case.
On the issues of what constitutes gerrymandering and whether the plaintiffs
had proven gerrymandering in Indiana, Justice White wrote for a four member
plurality including Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun. The dissenters,
Justices Powell and Stevens, joined them on the justiciability issue. The concurring
justices joined the plurality in finding no right to relief in the Indiana case.
Although the plurality was prepared to find partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional, it voted to deny relief in Indiana because the showing of injury was
insufficient. A clear majority of the Court, however, found the plurality's test
for gerrymandering vague and undefined. Thus the Davis decision invites further
clarification of what constitutes gerrymandering.
ORIGINS OF GERRYMANDERING
Gerrymandering is a long-standing problem. Patrick Henry attempted to
gerrymander James Madison out of a seat in the first Congress3 long before
Elbridge Gerry gave his name to the process in Massachusetts." In addition, the
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention expressed concern with the districting

1.
2.
3.

4.

Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University. B.A., Princeton University, 1962;
LL.B., Yale Law School, 1965. This article is based on a paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 3, 1987, and draws on a
presentation made at a panel of the New York State Political Science Association, April 5,
1986. The author wishes to express his thanks to his colleagues on both panels as well as to
Dean Martin Belsky and Professor Daniel H. Lowenstein for reading the manuscript and
making some very helpful suggestions.
106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986). A six member majority of the Court held that a claim of partisan
gerrymandering is justifiable. See the opinions of Justices White, 106 S. Ct. at 2803-07 and
Powell, 106 S. Ct. at 2825.
Id. at 2801-02.
3 I. BRANT, JAMEs MADISON 238 (1950). Henry claimed that he was trying to ensure the election
of someone devoted to the passage of amendments to the new costitution.
3 J. BARRY, HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS 369 (4th ed. 1857). Elbridge Gerry, in districting the
state of Massachusetts, sought to bolster the power of the Republican party.
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process5 and numerous statutory and constitutional provisions attest to continued
6
concern with the shaping of district lines.

Nevertheless, gerrymandering appears to have become a much more salient
problem since 1962 when Baker v. Carr7 was decided. Prior to Baker, district
lines were seldom altered and often followed county or municipal lines.8 Partisan
advantage resulted largely from malapportionment. The safety or competitiveness
of each district depended upon internal traditions. Baker, however, required states
to redistrict.9 In doing so, the dominant parties were forced to surrender the
advantages of malapportionment but they quickly learned how to use district
shape to accomplish their partisan ends.' 0
THE PROBLEM
Control over districting has enormous consequences. Popular majorities can,
by the way that lines are drawn, be transmuted into anything from a clean sweep
to a minority of elected positions." Control over state government therefore has
meant the opportunity to perpetuate party dominance of the state legislature,
and to extend its influence in Congress. Moreover, control over districting allows
the in-party to decide how many legislators will have safe seats and whose seats
will be safe, thus maintaining leadership influence over representatives that is
largely hidden from voters.
The impact of gerrymandering is underscored by some unusual alliances. In
Davis v. Bandemer the Indiana Democratic Party challenged the shape of district
lines drawn by the Republican Party. The National Republican Party filed an
amicus brief on behalf of the state Democratic party. 12 California Democrats
filed a brief on behalf of the Indiana Republican Party. 3
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.

12.
13.

M. FARRAND, 2 RECORDS OF Tn FEDERAL CoNVENTIoN 240-41 (1937) (Madison, interpreting
the draft of Article I, section 4 to include the power to restrict malapportionment of
congressional districts within states); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1964)
(describing the historical concern with districting).
See U.S. CoNsT., art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3 (proportioned by census); art I, sec. 4, cl. 1 (congressional
control over place and manner); 2 U.S.C.A. § 3 (expired 1929) (compact and contiguous). See
also Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REv. 77, 79-80,
86-88 (1985).
Although most state constitutions have provisions for periodic reapportionment, some state
legislatures ignored these provisions. Id. at 79 n. 11. Thus, following the Supreme Court's
ruling in Baker that a failure to periodically reapportion districts violated due process protections, many states were forced to reapportion their voting districts.
W. ELLIOTT, Ta-n RISmOF GuARDLw.N DEMocRAcy, 213-36, 266 (1974).
See Lowenstein & Steinberg, The Questfor Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive
or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1985); Excerpts from First Declaration of Bernard
Grofman in Badham v. Eu, PS 544, 546 (Summer 1985); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Republican
National Committee in Support of Appellees at 5-8 in Davis v. Bandemer [hereinafter Republican National Brief]. Justice O'Connor, Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2820-21, argues correctly that
there are limits. Specifically, Justice O'Connor focuses on the "self-limiting enterprise" of
gerrymandering in which a legislative majority must weaken "safe seats" in order to carry
more seats by narrower margins of votes. Id. at 2321. She is incorrect, however, in concluding
that the existence of limits makes the practice insignificant.
See Republican National Brief, supra note 11 at 2-3.
See D. Wells, "A Crucial Test on Gerrymandering," N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1985, at A27, col.
I (describing the political stakes); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Members of the
California Democratic Congressional Delegation, Davis v. Bandemer.
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1 A Test for Gerrymandering

The amicus briefs on both sides were premised on the fact that the Democratic
Party controls the majority of state legislatures that draw district lines. The
National Republican Party therefore sees the possibility of a national political
4
revolution if standards can be introduced.'
THE DA VIS V. BANDEMER DECISION
The Bandemer plurality concluded that a finding that a districting plan
violates the equal protection clause solely because of the shapes of the district
lines must be premised on both an intent to disadvantage the opposing political
party and substantial predictable success.' 5 The plurality concluded that intent is
virtually always present in districting cases-it would be hard for a political body
to close its eyes to the political implications.' 6 Thus, the significant issue was to
define sufficiently damaging effects of partisan districting.
In defining a sufficient effect to violate equal protection, the plurality refused
to rely on a mere disparity between the number of seats won and the party's
percentage share of the total vote.1 7 The plurality explained that if a large number
of the districts are competitive, i.e., the parties are relatively evenly balanced,
"even a narrow statewide preference for either party would produce an overwhelming majority for the winning party in the state legislature."'" The plurality
would neither require nor prohibit districting that yields such results. Nevertheless,
the plurality also decided that "parity between votes and representation sufficient
to ensure that significant minority voices are heard and that majorities are not
consigned to minority status, is hardly an illegitimate extrapolation from our
general majoritarian ethic. . ." '9 This prompted Justice O'Connor to conclude
that the plurality approach inevitably embraced proportional representation despite its explicit rejection. 20
The plurality decided that a sufficiently severe impact of partisan districting
requires proof that a party is "denied its chance to effectively influence [sic] the
political process." ' 2' The plurality directed consideration to the "influence on the
elections of the state legislature as a whole" and "evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority . . . or effective denial . . . of a fair chance to
influence the political process." 22 To exemplify the very high threshold the
plurality was attempting to set, it concluded that there could be no remedy for
gerrymandering without findings as serious as the consignment of the majority
party to minority status for a decade or the absence of hope that it would be
able to correct its minority status after the next census. 23 One commentator
concluded that the plurality was willing to remedy gerrymandering that disadvantages a majority party only in the event of a virtually total and permanent

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Republican National Brief, supra note 11, at 2-3.
Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2808, 2810.
Id. at 2808-09.
Id. at 2809.
Id.
Id. at 2807 n. 9.
Id. at 2822-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2810.
Id. at 2811.
Id. at 2812.
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consignment of that party to minority status. 24 The plurality offered no justification for such a high threshold other than the unsatisfactoriness of proportional
representation and the availability of the total exclusion standard.2 5
Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, who concurred
in holding that no violation of the equal protection clause had been shown,

argued that the Court should treat gerrymandering claims as nonjusticiable. 26
Their conclusion was based partly on the view that the plurality had proposed a
"nebulous standard ' 27 which would prove "unmanageable and arbitrary or else
evolve towards some loose form of proportionality. ' 28 Justice Powell, joined by
Justice Stevens, supported the plurality on the issue of justiciability but agreed
with Justice O'Connor's evaluation of the plurality's test. 29 They concur that the
way the districting affected the relative strength of the parties is a relevant
consideration, but their opinion is no clearer than the plurality's on this issue.
They deny the need for a "heightened effect" 30 where there is direct evidence of
intent to disadvantage the opposing party, but they appear to require disproportionate election results which are "serious enough' 'a3 to justify an independent
'3 2
finding of "vote dilution.
The major alternative to the standard offered by the plurality was offered
by Justices Powell and Stevens. They found a denial of equal protection because
the evidence showed that the Republican members of the legislature who drafted
the plan intended to minimize Democratic voting strength. For Powell and
Stevens, motive is the more likely form of evidence. 3 Under these conditions,
they would not demand proof of severe injury. The focus on a motivational
theory is whether a statute or other public act was done for an illicit purpose.

24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Lowenstein, "Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection," paper prepared for
delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 4,
1987, at 22-24.
Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2809-10.
Id. at 2816.
Id. at 2817.
Id. at 2822. Note, however, the tolerance of the same trio of justices for vague standards as
part of the majority in Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835 (1985) (89% deviation permissible)
and in joining Justice White, dissenting in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 766 (1983) (no
precise formula appropriate in state apportionment cases).
In Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2831, Powell wrote the plurality "fail[ed] to enunciate any standard."
Id. at 2831 n. 10.
Id. See also id. at 2827.
Id. at 2832.
In Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 753-54 (1983) Justice Stevens attacked motive as worthless
in the context of districting cases because the legislators cannot escape partisanship. Nevertheless,
Stevens returned to "a procedural standard" that is similar to motive. Id. at 759.
There is warrant for a focus on the intent of the legislature in some understandings of the
eighteenth century theories of protections against abuse of the democratic process. Blasi, The
Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH. J. 521 described
the primacy of the effort to control abuse of official power. That potential for abuse certainly
included the risk of temptation to misuse power. Levinson, Gerrymanderingand the Brooding
Omnipresence of ProportionalRepresentation: Why Won't It Go Away? 33 UCLA L. REv.
257, 261-64, 271 (1985) described a historic theory of representation which required that the
legislators mirror the feelings and interests of their constituents. This focus on identity of
feelings and interests is equivalent to a focus on motive. See also FARR"D, supra note 5, at
240-41 (Madison, describing abuses); Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness and the Supreme
Court, 33 UCLA L. REv. 227, 237-241 (1985) (officials may misuse their power).
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The dissenters treated partisan advantage in the electoral process as an illicit
purpose.
Nevertheless, motive is not a simple concept. 3 4 Motive can mean several
different things.3" For every different meaning of motive, there is a set of evidence
necessary to prove gerrymandering which is also sufficient to prove gerrymandering without reference to motivation. 36 The particular considerations suggested
34.

See Gottlieb, Reformulating the Motive/Effects Debate, 33 WAYNE L. Rav. 97 (1986); Blasi,
The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 CoLtm. L. REv. 449, 504-505 (1985)
(favors inquiry into motive); Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers:
A Subpoena For Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REv. 879 (1985) (privilege bars inquiry into
motive); Harper and Lupu, Fair Representation As Equal Protection, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1212,
1241-43 (1985) (motive and effects differ); Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal
Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89, 119 (1984)
(motive and effects differ but author suggests they should be equivalent because of contextual
variables acting on legislators); Note, Liberal Theory as Constitutional Doctrine: A Critical
Approach to Equal Protection, 73 GEo. L.J. 153 (1984) (effects should replace motive);
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U.
PA. L. REv. 1293, 1333-47 (1984) (distinguishes motive from effects); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv.
36, 98-103, 155-156 (1977) (motive differs from effects); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 540, 586 (1977) (Court rejected disproportionate impact); Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content
of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 979 (1983) (intent and motive differ); Note,

Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93

YALE

L.J. 111, 126-28 (1983) (motive differs from intent) and Note, Making the Violation Fit the

35.

Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328 (1982) (motive
and effects differ).
In a case brought under the Voting Rights Act, the Court considered restricting the proof of
motive to actual expressions of intent. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 67-68 (1979).
But see Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2808 (Opinion of White, J.); Karcher, 462 U.S. at 2671-72 (Opinion

36.

of Stevens, J.). It discarded that approach in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). For earlier
efforts to prove motive in the districting context see Gottlieb, Identifying Gerrymanders, 15
ST. Louis U. L. REv. 540, 542-44 (1971). (Thus motive can rest either on direct evidence or
inferential proof.
Barring successful inferences from legislative history or shape, motivational analysis becomes
virtually indistinguishable from examination of the partisan consequences of districting. Both
present the same major choices.
Assuming that a districting plan appears to favor one of the parties or a racial or other
group, the issue in a motivational analysis is whether this was the purpose. The analysis,
however, proceeds as if one merely registered effects under a rational basis. See Palmer v.

Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938) (strict scrutiny test). See also Minneapolis Star Tribune Co., 460 U.S. 575, 585 n.7
(1983); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). The courts will infer that the purpose was
racial or partisan if the districting cannot be satisfactorily explained in another way. The issue
then becomes the delineation of a satisfactory explanation. See Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2837-38
(Powell, J., dissenting). Logically the courts could accept any reason, insist on very strong
reasons or any level of requirement in between. If the courts accept any reason, it is essentially
employing rational basis analysis. If the courts accept only strong reasons they are essentially
employing a strict scrutiny analysis. Both levels of analysis are characteristic of nonmotivational
analysis. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 34, at 544 (comparing motive analysis to rational basis
analysis); J. ELY, DEMoCRAcY AND DISTRUST 145-46 (1980) (comparing motive with strict
scrutiny). On some of the difficulties with this form of analysis, see P. BREST & S. LEvINsoN,
PROCESSES OF CONSITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 553-63 (2d ed. 1983).

The motive approach taken by Justices Powell and Stevens requires this type of analysis at
an appropriate level of scrutiny. After checking to see whether the districting had favored an
identifiable group they ask whether the district lines can be justified. Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 283738 (Powell, J., dissenting) and Karcher, 462 U.S. at 759-61 (Stevens, J. concurring). Justification, however, is always possible. A districting plan that treats Democratic strongholds
differently can be described simply as beginning at particular locales, recognizing the boundaries

6
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by Powell and Stevens do not alter that conclusion. 7 As a result, with or without
motivational analysis, the crucial question is whether or not it will be possible

37.

of those locales and eventually incorporating in some unfortunately oddly shaped districts the
area that simply did not fit. See Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 21-27 (stated
policies might include compactness or community lines).
Thus in New York State one might begin in the west by protecting upstate Democratic cities
and begin in the east at the tip of Long Island. That would permit real recognition of municipal
and other political lines. It would also concentrate upstate Democrats in major cities instead
of leaving them divided among upstate rural Republicans. Then, however, the districting
commission would have had to pick up the remaining territory around "marginal" areas,
making or breaking large numbers of Republican or Democratic seats. Districts might look
odd, but the explanation is excellent. See Schneider v. Rockefeller, 328 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1001
(Sup. Ct.) aff'd 331 N.Y.S.2d 220 (App. Div.) aff'd 340 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1972), see also Bay
Ridge Council v. Carey, 115 Misc.2d 433, 437-38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1982) (quoting Schneider),
aff'd 103 A.D.2d 280 (1984), aff'd 66 N.Y.2d 657 (1985), appeal dismissed sub nom Rappleyea
v. Carey, 106 S. Ct. 3323 (1986).
The result of this analysis is that a pragmatic and realistic analysis of motive is likely to
force the Court to a position quite close to a strict scrutiny test-only motives that are
important enough so that it is reasonable to believe that people not motivated by partisanship
would pursue them, and only means closely tailored to achieve those goals so that those goals
in fact explain the plan, could explain the partisan results of a districting plan.
Little is gained by calling that a motive test. The inquiry is in fact a comparison of various
ends to ascertain their legitimacy and their importance and a comparison of ends with means.
Ultimately the issue is what the legislature may do and what it may not do in drawing district
lines.
Justice Powell, trying to develop a motivational analysis, referred to the procedures used in
enacting districting legislation and the legislative history of the districting statute as sources
from which to glean intent. Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2832 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Republicans, however, need not have been so secretive. They could have made the same
proposals in the open, gone through the charade of hearings, and decided that they liked the
plan well enough to pass it. The motivation would be no different though the outward forms
were more fair. Unless Powell intends not to refer to "actual" intent but to appearances, the
absence of the procedural and historical irregularities that he described do not suggest purity
of motive but only sophistication of means. Recognizing the difficulties, Justice White downplayed the utility of examining legislative intent, arguing that partisan motives are virtually
inherent and unavoidable in this area. Id. at 2808-09.
But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), and Weinstein, Partisan Gerrymandering: The Next Hurdle in the Political Thicket, 1 J. L. AND POL. 357, 374-75 (1984) (arguing
that direct evidence of intent is the best test for gerrymandering)), it seems reasonable that
Justices Powell and Stevens will be forced to define further their views on shape and adherence
to boundaries, the remaining criteria they identified apparently as tests of intent. Davis, 106 S.
Ct. at 2831-32.
Shapes and boundaries are of limited utility as tests for gerrymandering, however, for several
reasons. As proposed, shape appears subjective. See id. at 2832. That subjectivity could be
cured by a wealth of proposed definitions of compact shapes. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462
U.S. at 756 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing measures of compactness). But regularity of
shape conflicts with honoring existing political boundaries and both conflict with requirements
of equality of population. See Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983). Choosing among the
three criteria create infinite possibilities for partisan considerations: since some existing political
boundaries must be pierced, the choice of which to pierce has enormous consequences. See
Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 35; Declaration of Nelson W. Polsby in Badham
v. Eu, in PS 568, 570 (Summer 1985). Regularity of shape, moreover, is quite consistent with
substantial partisan tilting of the district lines. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 2127. Formal qualities like shape will prove satisfactory if the fairness is either defined by the
shapes themselves or is undefinable. But regular geometric shapes that can expand or reverse
popular statewide majorities are not self-justifying. Hence one can reasonably look behind
shape-good shape-and still seek to identify motive or ascertain whether the package is
justifiable. In effect, shape works if the plurality is wrong about the possibility of testing the
validity of districting by examining the severity of its consequences on the relative strength of
the two parties. If, however, the plurality is correct, a shape test will not answer the fundamental
question of fairness.
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to look at a map and some set of demographic data and conclude that a state
has or has not been gerrymandered.
In summary, the Court has told us what gerrymandering is not: it is not
proportional representation; it is not minor disadvantage. s The high threshold
announced by the plurality requires a justification. Its inability to find any
measure of gerrymandering short of a very high threshold, and the measurement
of that threshold itself-frustration and denial of a fair chance-require a
yardstick. If Justice O'Connor is correct,3 9 the Court will become involved in an
endless morass with highly political overtones. Gerrymandering must be defined
so that the cases involving district shape can emerge with the clarity of the cases
involving district population.
DEFINING GERRYMANDERING
Although a wealth of materials describing techniques for and possible measures of gerrymandering exists, 4° the significance of that material depends on
normative standards.4 ' For example, imagine a community divided on a northsouth line. 42 East of the line the community is made up of blacks, Democrats,
poor people and a liberal middle class. West of the line are whites, Republican
and the more affluent. The simple question posed by all arguments about
43
gerrymandering is whether to create homogeneous or heterogeneous districts.
Homogeneous districts will be quite safe for the representative parties. The
number of seats won by representatives of each race and party will also probably
be roughly proportional to their proportion among the voters.
Heterogeneous districts are less likely to be safe districts. The number of
seats won by members of each race and party will not tend to be roughly
proportional. Instead, the dominant party in any given election will tend to win
a disproportionate number of seats. If the public sentiment changes between
elections, the other party is likely to win a disproportionate number of seats. A
relatively small number of voters may hold the balance of power. Voter influ-

38.
39.
40.

41.

42.
43.

Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2809-11.
Shapiro, supra note 33, at 252-56.
Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 7-8 (describing the technique for gerrymandering);
Grofman, supra note 8, at 77, 117-18 (techniques for and commensurate measures of gerrymandering); Niemi, The Relationship Between Votes and Seats: The Ultimate Question in
Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REv. 185, 191-201 (measures of gerrymandering). See
also Neimi, "The Effects of Districting on Trade-offs Among Party Competition, Electoral
Responsiveness, and Seats-Votes Relationships," in B. GRoFmAN, A. LuPAT, R. McKAY &
H. SCARROW, REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTrNG IssuEs 35 (1982) (describing a larger set of
measures for different aspects of partisan gerrymandering).
Commentators have focused on active, structural and historic considerations. Lowenstein &
Steinberg, supra note 11, at 27-35 (techniques are normatively neutral); Shapiro, supra note
33, at 237-41 (comparing active and structural criteria); Levinson, supra note 33, at 257, 26164, 271 (describing two historic theories of representation and finding republican values
antithetical to proportional representation).
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) describes a pattern of that type in New Orleans.
If the lines are drawn north-south, then each district will tend to be homogeneous. Some
districts will lie wholly within the black and Democratic district. Others will lie wholly within
the white Republican district. There may be a competitive district on the border with elements
of both sides of the division of the community. If the lines are drawn east-west, each district
will tend to be heterogeneous-each district will contain some people from both sections of
town.
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encing factors not confined to single legislative districts are likely, therefore, to

have strong generalized consequences.
Proportional representation requires homogeneous districts. Each group, with

relatively safe seats, is assured of representation. Proportionality is relatively
attainable because results are relatively predictable.
All of the members of the Court specifically declined to find that propor-

tionality is required or even desirable, but fione of the members of the Court
found that proportionality is forbidden either. Notions of proportionality have

already played a large part in judicial and scholarly thinking in this area. Many
proposals assume that we should choose homogeneous districting."

Since the

Court has employed a "motive" test for discrimination in districting4 and since

in some circumstances the Voting Rights Act only requires that current districting

do no more damage to minority rights than past districting," the Court has not

always required homogeneous districting.4 7 It has been assumed, however, that
heterogeneous districting would dilute the voting power of blacks. This conclusion
rests on the concept of polarized voting. 4 If whites and blacks refuse to vote
for each others' candidates, then the defeated group loses completely. The winning
candidate will not be the least conciliatory and the defeated group cannot expect
by its pressure to change the district's politics in the short run. It is simply
49
excluded from power.
The assumption that homogeneous lines are appropriate dates back to the
concerns of incumbent black officeholders in such cases as Wright v. Rockefeller.50
However, that which is good for incumbent black officeholders is not necessarily
good for the black community. In nonpolarized communities, it can be argued

that assuring the black community of large majorities in some districts wastes
their votes and influence."

It might be better for the black community to have

the ear of a large number of elected officials who are caught in the middle and
44.

Niemi, supra note 40, at 41, advocates a compromise between a wide range of vote shares in
which seats will turn over, thus requiring relatively homogeneous districts, and an effort to
provide a substantial number of competitive districts. Grofman, supra note 8, at 93-99, 12649, measures racial proportionality and Grofman, "For Single-Member Districts, Random is
Not Equal," in GROFMAN et al., supra note 40, at 55-58, criticizes random methods of
generating districts because they depart from proportionality. But see Grofman, supra note 8,
at 171 (objecting that the Supreme Court placed too much emphasis on proportionality).
The court's consistent position in the racial districting cases under the Voting Rights Act
has been that heterogeneous districting dilutes black votes. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613
(1982) (evaluating vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. at
725, 754 n.13 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (familiarity with vote dilution under the Voting
Rights Act); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 157-60, (1971) (multimember districts dilute
voting power).

45.

See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 67-68; Rogers, 458 U.S. at 621. Note that a showing
of intentional discrimination is a necessary element in equal protection racial vote dilution
claims.

46.
47.
48.
49.

See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. at 134-36.
Id.
See Grofman, supra note 8, at 135-45.
Justice O'Connor's view that only suspect classes should be protected against gerrymandering
can be supported by analysis of polarized voting. See Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2820 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
For a discussion of Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) and related districting cases, see
Gottlieb, supra note 35, at 540, 548-49 (1971).
Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 7-8, 29.

50.
51.
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forced to temporize than a small number of wholly committed delegates who
wield fewer votes in the legislature and can more easily be discounted.
Where polarized voting is not the case, the losers exert a good deal of
influence on district politics because a coalition with a group of the former
majority might tip the balance. That defines the political center in the district.
The plurality's rejection of proportional representation is partly related to this
fact.
In a community that is not polarized, therefore, there can be a distinct
advantage in participating in elections in several districts instead of being segregated into a homogeneous district. The opportunity to exert influence on several
representatives exists. It is not correct, therefore, to assume that homogeneous
districting is advantageous for all groups.5 2 Even for blacks in currently polarized
districts it is not clear that the best route toward long-run influence is through
homogeneous districting. Whether or not analogies to integration among school
children or military servicemen are apt, there is little reason to expect barriers
to be broken by segregation.
There is even less reason to believe that homogeneous districting serves any
important function for others. Where homogeneous districting serves no important
function, there is little reason to treat it as constitutionally mandated. Indeed the
plurality found much gerrymandering only marginally significant since other
channels of influence may be pursued. Because the plurality believed that gerrymandering often does not make much difference, it insisted on proof of severe
injury.53
Political scientists have been chronicling the decline of party identification
at the polls. 54 It is not clear whether that decline is continuing, permanent or
temporary.55 If the decline continues it may become inappropriate to talk about
politically polarized voting.
Nevertheless, districting does affect political decisions. In government, as
Justice Powell pointed out, 56 the parties continue to dominate legislative and
governmental processes. Voting in the legislature is polarized on the issue of
legislative leadership. Legislative agendas, committee assignments and other forms
of significant patronage are affected by party victories. Party voting, therefore,
should continue to be treated as special if party identification continues to have

52.

53.
54.

See generally Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 29 (making this argument in the
context of municipalities). Compare the discussions of geographic criteria in Karcher, 462 U.S.
at 754-60, (Stevens, J.,concurring), 787 (Powell, J., dissenting), 776 (White, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that geographic and "political boundaries" are more resistant to political manipulation).
See e.g., Davis, 106 S.Ct. at 2810 (White, J.) ("losers" may exert influence) and 2820-21,
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (heterogeneous districts create risks of opposition victories).
See, e.g., N. Nm, S. VERBA & J. PEamociK, THE CHANGING AMERiCAN VOTER 47-73 (1979)
(tying the rise and fall of party identification to the rise and fall of ideological voting); Asher,
Voting Behavior Research in the 1980s: An Examination of Some Old and New Problem
Areas, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DiSCIPLNE 339, 355 (1983) (showing significance

55.
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of party affiliation in congressional elections); id. at 375 (showing evaluation of candidatedominated presidential and congressional elections); Kinder, Diversity and Complexity in
American Public Opinion, id. at 389, 392-96 (1983) (showing that the role of ideology does
not appear to be increasing).
See supra note 54.
Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2830.
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major influence on voting or in the legislature. Under these conditions, homogeneous districting can protect the influence of members of the state party not
in power.
Unfortunately, homogeneous districts divide and may help to polarize. Campaigns in homogeneous districts may additionally exacerbate disputes. Most
important, homogeneous districts tend to be safe districts, offering the public
57
little opportunity to reject and replace officeholders.
Since the public can achieve representation through heterogeneous districts,
homogeneous districts are not essential. Because of the disadvantages of homogeneous districts, they may not be wise.
Reading the Constitution to require homogeneous districting is wrong for a
second reason. The Constitutional Convention recognized it as one of two valid
competing types of politics, but not the only or most necessary system." Expressed
as a desire for local representation, homogeneous districting lost crucial battles.
Madison expressed the contrary tradition succinctly in The FederalistNo. 10. He
sought a plan which would juxtapose different groups in such a way that elections
would "refine and enlarge" the public views by taking into account more than
the parochial views of discrete factions. 9 Thus Madison advocated a more regional
approach to democracy than the more local approach advocated by some of his
colleagues.
There is no particular reason to treat the Constitution as excluding either
theory. The Convention clearly recognized the legitimacy of both and compromised between them. The constituencies of the House and Senate differ. The
House itself reflects a compromise between a greater and a lesser localism. Larger
districts would prove more heterogeneous. On the other hand, smaller ones would
be more homogeneous. The Convention chose a minimum figure higher than
some sought and lower than some proposed. ° Given that conflicting history, it
is therefore unclear on what basis we now claim that Madison's plan was
unconstitutional.
Neither the First nor Fourteenth Amendment abandoned that compromise
for the states. Neither regional nor local theories of democracy forms an exclusive
theory of representative democracy which the Fourteenth Amendment can incorporate. And there is nothing in the history of the Amendment to suggest that
the Thirty-ninth Congress focused on either the gerrymandering problem in
6 1
particular or regional- or community-oriented democratic theories in general.
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See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580-81 (1964); Gottlieb, supra note 35, at 547.
Support for homogeneous districting was evident in the 1787 Convention's emphasis on local
representation. See Levinson, supra note 33, 261-64; 1 FARRAND, supra note 5, at 48-49, 56
(George Mason) (representatives should know and sympathize with their constituents); id. at
185, 191 (James Wilson) (members should speak the language of their constituents); id. at 568
(Madison) "to bring ... all the local information" needed); 2 FARRAND supra note 5, at 644
(George Washington) (more representatives needed to protect the rights and interests of the
people). See also Gottlieb supra note 35, at 546-550 (developing the legitimacy of the competing
theories of districting).
0
Madison's was a balanced view-the House also had to be large enough to represent local
interests accurately. See I FARRAN, supra note 5, at 568. Nevertheless, he explained the new
Constitution as transcending those interests.
Id. at 559-560.
This raises two questions: whether the First Amendment and/or Fourteenth Amendment
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Nothing in either amendment pertains to the choice between these specific theories
of democracy.
Therefore, all of the measures of districting that take as their basis a choice
between these two types of districts are fundamentally in error. 62 Proportional
representation can neither be required nor prohibited. As the next section makes
clear, however, combinations of the two may be thoroughly unacceptable.
An Alternative
Neutrality, the unbiased and equal treatment of voters, partisans, and dis6a
tricts, is the essential constitutional standard with respect to district lines.
Neutrality can best be defined by symmetry, whether each party has the same
number of districts with the same difference from its statewide average support
as the other party. 64 Symmetry gives each party the same advantages and disadvantages. If one party receives disproportionate support in a district, so must the
6
other, and in the same degree and number.
Effective gerrymandering is precisely the opposite of symmetry. It represents
the inconsistent use of both districting policies to "waste" opposition votes by
concentrating as many opposing voters as possible in a few safe districts. By
doing so, gerrymandering leaves a larger number of districts to be controlled by
smaller but quite secure friendly majorities. 66 Thus symmetry attacks the core of
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66.

interdict voting discrimination and/or gerrymandering and whether they or either of them set
up standards and what they are. That the Congress did not focus on gerrymandering does not
settle the issue of whether control of the practice is a necessary part of the concepts written
into the tests of the amendments or the goals of the Congress in developing the amendments.
This includes considerations of competitiveness, see Polsby, supra note 37, at 571, range of
responsiveness, and the swing ratio. Niemi, supra note 41, at 36; Grofman, supra note 9, at
149-50.
A competitive district is one in which competing parties are evenly balanced. It necessarily
assumes and depends on heterogeneous districting. The range of responsiveness is the range of
different statewide vote percentages at which one party will gain or lose seats. The swing ratio
measures the rate at which a party wins or loses seats for each percent change in its statewide
vote. Some commentators urge a broad range of responsiveness and a swing ratio which
permits a continuous change of seats as a party wins or loses votes. These are sophisticated
descriptions for largely, but not completely homogeneous, districting.
See Police Department v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), Karst, Equality as a Central Principle
in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 (1975), Stone, Content Regualtion and the
First Amendment, 25 Wr.LIAM AND MARY L. REv. 189 (1983). The author has been critical of
the Court's reliance on neutrality theory, see Gottlieb, The Speech Clause and the Limits of
Neutrality, 51 ALB. L. REv. (forthcoming) and in particular its failure to examine the restrictive
consequences of the preconditions of the theory and the division between public and private
rights in the light of first amendment interests. Neutrality in this context is consistent with and
protective of the purposes of the first amendment. Indeed failure to employ neutrality analysis
in this context allows governmental bodies to trench on private rights.
It should be based on voting rather than registration statistics. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra
note 11, at 57, treat this as an effort to identify precisely what proportion of the public will
actually cast their vote for each party and point out that it is impossible to ascertain that
proportion in advance. Niemi responds that we should not want to identify such phenomena.
Niemi, supra note 40, at 195-96. The data set chosen should reflect predisposition reflected
in past, not future, voting behavior.
Shapiro, supra note 33, worries that this will prove too complex and that the Court will
ultimately be impelled to move toward proportional representation. Id. at 252-56. He acknowledges that this would be doctrinal disaster and historically as incorrect as it would be unwise.
But he thinks it will triumph because it is easier to understand than the complex mathematics
involved in other votes-seats districting standards.
See Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2802; Gottlieb, supra note 35, at 550; Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra
note 11, at 6-8.
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the problem-the inconsistent use of policies for political gain. Asymmetrical
districting is discriminatory. In doctrinal terms it is not neutral.
In ordinary parlance, symmetry provides an equivalent opportunity for both
parties to win elections. It is not a formula with respect to results. It is not
therefore proportional representation. The public, rather than either legislature
or courts, has the right to determine who wins.
However, even if it can be assumed that the Convention meant to authorize
Congress to deal with gerrymandering or that the Fourteenth Amendment permits
the Court to deal with it, should it not also be assumed that the Convention and
the First and Thirty-Ninth Congresses never considered neutrality in general or
symmetry as a special consequence of the neutrality standard?
The problem with that conclusion is that there were some principles on which
the founders agreed as well as those which they compromised. Among the
principles agreed upon were the representative character of all government institutions, the fundamental equality of all mankind and the emerging consensus
that structured class representation had to give way to equal representation of
all voters. 67 Whether we should encompass symmetry analysis in this context
depends in part on the implications for gerrymandering of the principles agreed
on by the founders and incorporated in the document they wrote. This may be
another instance in which the progress of understanding allows us more fully to
realize their purposes than they themselves could.
It was no part of their jurisprudence that future courts should be restricted
to the limitations of their own understanding. The founders expected constitutional purposes to be followed and fulfilled where provisions were vague.6 Failure
to employ the progress of understanding in interpreting provisions of the Constitution will result in failure to achieve their purposes as well as they currently
could be. That conclusion would require justification both with respect to the
founders' jurisprudence and with respect to any intentionalist theory.
Neutrality stands on a strong footing under an intentionalist jurisprudence.
Violation of neutrality in district line drawing defeats all relevant constitutional
purposes. No theory of democracy abides favoritism-treating one party differently than another.
Nothing in a local theory supports variation in the degree to which different
districts are accorded the privilege of a close and effective representation of the
people. In the terms of that theory, some districts would have been favored and
some disfavored by a non-neutral districting system.
In addition, there is nothing in a regional theory which supports variation
in the degree to which different districts combined different interests. Instead,
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See generally D.

LUTZ,

POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL (1980) and G. WOOD, TiE
1776-1787 (1969).

CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,

68.

See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HAav. L. REv. 885, 888-913
(1985) (competing traditions stressed language or purpose; neither tradition treated the specific
meaning of the framers as significant); W. CROssKEY, 1 PoLImcs AND THE CONSTITUTION 36469 (1953) (common law tradition stressed objective purpose); Dewey, James Madison Helps
Clio Interpret the Constitution, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 38-43 (1971) (Madison stressed
public over private purposes, downgrading the importance of the Philadelphia debates and
argued, parallel to common law traditions, that the Constitution should be understood in light
of the problems which gave rise to it). See 1 W. BLACKSrONE, COMMENTARIES 59-62, 87 (1803).
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those districts which were more homogeneous would appear to receive less
enlightened representation, prove more susceptible to mob fashions and sacrifice
legitimate and enduring minority interests.
Systems of districting that discriminate among the parties in the terms of
both regional and local theories of democracy, which can be justified by neither
theory of democracy accepted by the framers of the Constitution and the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, should not prove acceptable to us.
If one looks at elections as popular protection against official abuse of
power, 69 incumbents ought not have the power to exclude change by protecting
70
a party. If one looks at districting through self-government theory, the public
should have either the right to local representation (through a community oriented
districting) or the right to electoral choice (through cross-community or regional
districting). Favoritism gives them neither. It excludes choice via safe districts. It
excludes local representation for some groups that it gives others. It denies equal
treatment in all respects.
Neutrality has played a major part in First Amendment jurisprudence." It
captures the instinct which makes proportional representation so alluring but does
so more accurately by defining equal treatment as the issue rather than the type
of politics.
The neutrality model and its symmetrical derivative are not without difficulties. The problem is whether it is possible to district neutrally or symmetrically
for two or more variables. If districting is done symmetrically with respect to
Republicans and Democrats, can it also be done symmetrically for blacks and
whites? Since blacks tend to be Democrats but a large proportion of Democrats
are not black, merely scrutinizing for party allegiance would permit considerable
black/white variations among districts. The fact that the overwhelming proportion
of blacks are Democrats also simplifies the task of symmetrical racial districting.
It is necessary only to allocate among Democrats and need not confound interparty symmetry.
Groups that cut more evenly across party lines may present more difficulties.
Assume, for example, that environmentalists or peace groups or abortion groups
are not as highly correlated with party lines as is race. Does one then have to
treat Republican anti-abortionists within the Republican Party in a consistent
way and do the same within the Democratic Party? If one works out symmetrical
solutions within each party there is no necessary reason to expect that the groups
will be ranged symmetrically among the districts. If the districts are ranged
symmetrically according to sentiment on the abortion issue, can party allegiance
similarly be ranged symmetrically among the districts?
Plainly, the more groups which we choose to account for symmetrically, the
more difficult-or perhaps impossible-the task becomes. That in turn raises the
question whether the key variable in the entire process is polarization. Earlier we
noted that districting was crucial to blacks because they could not exert influence
in heterogeneous districts. Thus, it makes a tremendous difference to blacks
69.
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REs. J. 521 (1977).
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whether they are united in black districts or divided among several heterogeneous
districts. By contrast, to the extent that voters are not polarized they can and
will exert influence in both contexts-albeit the influence will assume a different
garb. In a more homogeneous districting plan they control a proportion of the
seats. In a more heterogeneous districting plan they will change the overall
complexion of each district, altering the crucial location on the political continuum
of the swing voters in their districts.
Parties, however, reflect discrete choices rather than fungible lines of influence. 72 Thus it seems necessary to take the trouble to protect the fairness of the
districting process among the parties.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF?
Gerrymandering perverts the American political system. In place of both
local and regional representation it substitutes an amalgam which leaves the
political system noncompetitive at both local and statewide levels. It is noncompetitive locally because of homogeneous districting. It is noncompetitive at the
statewide level because concentrations of partisans have been manipulated for
political advantage. The result is a caricature of democracy.
Neutrality goes to the heart of that amalgam. It forbids neither local nor
regional representation. Each state can arrange whichever kind of political system
seems most congenial. What neutrality does forbid is rigging the system.
Each of the opinions in Davis posed as a challenge the definition of serious
partisan effects of election line drawing. The plurality stated a general standard
and asked the future to respond as it had to Baker v. Carr, with precise and
manageable standards. The concurrence doubted the possibility that such a
standard could be formulated. The dissent found the majority's approach much
too vague. If the challenge is to be met, it ought not be met with a choice of
politics which would fundamentally alter American democracy, limiting strengths
the founding generation intended us to enjoy. Of the potential standards, neutrality alone offers the possibility that the challenge can be met.
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